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Summary
This working paper was prepared for the workshop on
"Aid and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa" in Arusha,
27-29 June, 1998, with financial support from the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is based on a
series of interviews with aid agencies operating in Somalia
after the crisis of 1992-1993. It tries to map out how
different agencies reacted in a state-less society, which
efforts they made to help re-build local administrative and
political structures, which local partners they worked
with, how they dealt with security issues, and how they
assessed the prospects for the future of Somalia.
The report first gives a critical overview over the
problems and the different positions held on these issues,
before giving a short overview over the respons es of the
different agencies.
The central observation of the report is the dilemma
faced by agencies which want to give humanitarian aid
to the affected people without compromising the efforts
of the local population to form new local structures, and
without contributing to a continuation of internal
warfare. It shows that agencies find different solutions to
these problems, and act on different assumptions and
hence with different objectives - though towards a
common goal.
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Humanitarian assistance during conflict in a state-less society:
The case of Somalia
Aid organizations which continued to operate in Somalia after the civil war in the early 1990s
are faced with an extraordinarily diffcult sItuation. There is a gre at need for humanItarian aid,
but there is no legItimate state authority to which the organizations can relate, and the identity
of partners for collaboration is uncertain. Even more problematic is the confusion about who
are the recipients of aid. The lack of c1ear strctures on both the authority and recipient side
raises the prospect that instead of reaching people in need, aid may go to the warlords and
fuel the conflct. The problem has been noted in many situations, but is paricularly serious
in the Somalia case (Alex de Waal 1995, 1996, Mark Duffeld 1996, John Prendergast 1996,
1997, Michael Maren 1997).
The humanitarian motivation of giving aid to save lives and reduce human suffering is not
invalidated by the fact that relief aid, once it assumes massive proportions, necessarily
constitutes an intervention that rarely is neutral in Its effect on the conflct. However, the aid
intervention in Somalia has been sharp ly criticized for having little or no relation to Somali
society or the decision-making processes of the recipients.
This paper discusses some of the dilemmas of providing humanItarian assistance during
conflict as these appear in the context of Somalia in the 1990s. Specific attention is given to
the issue of the relationship between aid and authority, and the role of the Somali state - or
Its alternative - in the transition from relief aid to development assistance. The analysis is
partly based on structured interviews with major Scandinavian and other international aid
agencies that operate in Somalia in the 1990s. A sumary of these interviews is given in the
second part of the report.
I: DILEMMAS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE:
An understanding of the dilemmas facing foreign aid organizations must take as its staring
point the nature, and disappearance, of the Somali state. Somalia, it will be recalled, was for
two decades known as the only ethnically homogenous state in Africa. This gave reason for
concern among neighbors when Somalia elaimed areas inhabited by Somali people in
Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, all of which had considerable Somali minorities in the border
areas. A "Pan-Somali" ideology might have served the militar regime to create an alternative
legitimacy for the centralised nation state. Yet, instead of uniting the Somali people in all
these areas into one nation, the Somali state broke apar in internal fighting.
Several observers have argued that the Somali governent never represented the Somali
people in any meaningful way. The Somali state was purelya creation of the colonial powers.
The Somali people were divided between British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya
and Djibouti (or French Somaliland). At independence, the Italian and British colonies of
Somalia were united under one state, and its administration handed over to Somalis who were
at hand and could take over: persons and parties created by the colonial authorities from elItes
in their service. They inherited a state apparatus and a military, but no meaningful relations
to the cultural life of the nomadic elans and families in the countryside. The Somali society -
which revolves around, and is structured into, elans, subelans, lineages and families - did not
even provide the tax base for a central governent: the latter existed largelyon resources
provided by foreign aid, ineluding military assistance (Heimich 1997:124, Lewis 1996:24).
While the elan structure continued to govern local life, the governent was confined to
administer Somalia's participation in the international world of states. Based on military
power and functioning in the margins of the society, the leaders were viewed by the people
as the donors' governent - or, after the coup which brought General Siad Barré to power,
that of the military establishment. When Siad Barré tried to establish controlover the
country, elashes ensued, andthe governent responded with military force. That eventually
brought the elan structure up against the governent and led to civil war. When Siad Barré
was ousted and sent into exile with his military elites, a structure of warlords develop in the
military power structure which existed alongside the elans , each of them aspiring to inherit
state power. The elan leaders, however, generally did not see a ne ed for a new governent,
and were unwiling to provide resources for its establishment.
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Somewhat simplified, the present "amorphous" or "anarchic" situation in Somalia can thus be
described as a competition between two opposing concepts of politicalorder: the "central
governent and military" tradition of the warlords, versus the people's representation in elan
leaders, elders, local councils.
In this perspective, the "implosion" of governent, as it is termed in an international context,
may from a Somali point of view appear far less dramatic. Somalis may simply see the
dissolution of an unnecessary, predatory and dysfunctional structure, whose absenee makes
possible a more "natural" development and more representative forms of self-determination, -
a freer life for the elans.
It has been said that those who attempt to explain the Somali elan systems to others, have not
understood anything of it. It can at best (drawing on LM.Lewis) be described in glimpses:
The elan and the subunits live in a nomadic economy, and constitute loose, situationally
cooperating groupings. An elaborate balanee of power, with a system of cross-cutting and
shifting alliances, assures that no single elan or group becomes too powerfuL. The primary
function of elan, family and tribal structure is to secure every member's physical safety, life,
and health. The traditionally flexible system of fragile alliances serves to aid the weak and
secure their "democratic" rights. Everybody is bound to stand in for anyone else who is in
trouble. Somali rally automatically and unquestioningly around any member needing their
support against another elan or an outsider. An unlimited right to solidarity with members
can mean a family standing against another family, it may mean one elan against another or
all the Somali against other peoples. These situationally fluctuating levels of solidarity help
to maintain an equilibrium which does not allow domination of one over the others. In that
context, one family might even command the support of another more distant family or elan
against a nearer one in a situation where the adversar is becoming too strong and potentially
dominating.
This mechanism also has a conflct-generating aspect. As LM. Lewis describes it: "One of
the main problems is that all these units are in principle flexible and fluid, they are reactively
de fine d in opposition to opponents" (Lewis 1996:16). It is me against my brother; it is me
and my brother against my half brother; it is the brothers against our unele; it is the family
against another family; it is both families against a neighboring group; and it is the whole elan
against another one. On the other hand, when a family feud threatens to disrupt the peace or
the balance, elders will start negotiations for reconciliation, a compensation wil eventually
be agreed and paid, and that puts an end to the hostilities. Balancing mechanisms favoring
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peace are also found in the "Xeer", the traditional oral law, the judges administering it, and
the religion. A factor of considerable importance may be the relations any Somali has to
other families and clans through their wives' close relationship to the family-in-Iaw. The
women can thus assume a central role in maintaining peace.
One critical operational question for the donors in this kind of situation is to find appropriate
structures of authority with which they can work. All donors say they support the people.
But they differ in their views as to who represents the people, and which administrative links
to use for bringing their aid to the people. Should they work with the warlords who wield
very tangible power in their respective areas of control, or work with "local representatives"?
In the latter case, who are the legitimate local representatives - the district councils, or the
clan leaders and elders? Or should the aid organizations wait for a new national governent
to be formed, or for local representative bodies to emerge out of the slow, Somali social
process of achieving consensus through continuous debate and negotiation?
Another set of questions concem the purpose and consequences of aid: Does aid in practice
feed the war? Does it reach the local people who are most in need? And does it help them
to re-construct socIal conditions and an economic base that encourage a return to self-
suffciency? Or does aid create and perpetuate their dependency as receivers? What is the
effect of aid on the re-emergence of indigenous strctures of authority, administrative
capacities, and lines ofrepresentation? In particular, how does aid affect the balance between
the opposing concepts of politicalorder: the European-st yle central state or the traditional
balance of power system of the clans? More generally, does aid strengthen the emergence of
a newadministration from above, or an administrative capacity 1egitimized through
representation from and accountability to local and indigenous social structures?
The dilemmas of relief versus dependency are aptly ilustrated by an experience recorded by
the Médecins sans Frontières in Kismayo. Local people wanted to use the local MSF-
established hospital, but saw its operation as the responsibility of MSF. They were not
wiling to contribute to costs or to share administrative responsibilities. For MSF the question
was whether to hand over the hospital nevertheless, wIth the possibility that it would fall into
neglect within a short period, or to continue to run it themselves. As long as the local people
could rely on a donor to operate the hospital, they would not invest their resources to maintain
it. If the MSF pulled out, the local population might then waIt for another donor to come to
their rescue. For the MSF, the question could come down to how many innocent people would
have to die for the principle of handing over responsibility? (Jan Stevens, MsF, Kismayo,
interview 28.4. 1998).
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Some foreign aid workers maintain that "handing over" is not possible because the Somali
have no concept of public resources, and cannot convert public into private. In one story
from Gadabursi, a man was given the responsibility to maintain the local well and charge
fees, 50 % of which he was to keep as his salary, the other 50 % being a collective revenue.
Within few weeks the man was kiled by his cousin, because he refused to share the
(common) resources he collected. (Michael van Notten, EHDA, interview, 20.5.1998)
The dilemmas of relief versus dependency relate to the more fundamental question conceming
recipient responsibilty. As soon as the immediate emergency is over, the issue of recipient
orientation, responsibility and self-suffciency reappear on the agenda. In the long ru, it is
not possible to aid recipients who seem to lack the wil to become self-reliant again.
However, adaptations may nevertheless lead to "self suffciency strategies" in which donors
are to remain a regular source of supplies.
Donor agencies are not always clear as to who the recipients are, who represents them, who
can organise and finance permanent solutions. Often it is unclear who is administratively
responsible for the recipients. Can aid be given without administrative authorities? How can
aid lead over to rehabilitation if, as in Somalia today, there are few structures available for
a "recipient orientation"? The very term "recipient" is interpreted differently, meaning
anything from the individual accepting a dish of food at the field kitchen of the Red Cross,
to the state authorities with which aid agencies negotiate the terms of assistance.
It is by now commonly accepted in donor communities that aid agencies must assess the
capacity of recipients to organise, otherwise they may easily be manipulated by their supposed
clients. Negative forms of recipient organisation may occur for manipulative purposes, as
observed in refugee camps in the Ogaden. Donars insisted on controllng food distribution
and defining rations by their own standards. As the Somali refugees in the camps were not
given any influence on distributions, they tried to maximise them. Their self-styled leaders
justified taxing the camp population, arguing that only their organised pressure could
guarantee undisrupted supplies of donations. They put pressure on the donors for more
distributions, sabotaging all attempts of donor agencies to encourage self-help, and
emphasizing the refugees' claim to distributions. When donor agencies decided to reduce
handouts, the self-styled leaders brought together starving children, threatening to present them
to the international press as victims of arbitrary donor policies. Some donors suspected the
camp leaders were deliberately keeping some children severely undernourished as a proof of
continuing need for aid. The camp leaders, for their part, clearly considered the donors as
a normal source for resources, and were wiling to take violent action to maintain this
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"rightful" supply of income, to which they considered having a legitimate claim, a traditional
right (Pausewang 1994).
In principle, then, it is vital for donors in emergency situations to develop early and solid
relations with organisational structures of the recipients, to help rebuild indigenous capacities
to administer services which can only temporarily be provided by the donors. Failing this,
the most like ly result wil be that recipients turn into clients, and recipient structures into
permanent pressure groups or even criminal gangs set on extracting aid. How a workable
strategy can be developed in practice, however, is unclear. There are no set recipes.
Humanitarian assistance and security
The involvement of aid agencies in Somalia was further made diffcult by acute security
problems. At the hight of the civil strife, in the early 1990s, looting of relief supplies, attacks
on relief transport, burglaries in food depots and hijacking of aid agencies were ramp ant.
Even burglaries in the homes of Somali families who had received aid distributions became
common, while in some areas warlords or factions "taxed" the population on the distributions
received.
The aid agencies reacted differently to this situation. Some pulled out, while others hired
ared guards to protect their operations. Others tried to protect themselves by negotiating
with dominant warlords or local clans. The agencies recognized that negotiating with
warlords would add to the legitimacy of the latter, hence indirectly they became involved in
the conflict. But accepting that a proportion of aid deliveries would get to the warlords,
through direct theft or through taxation, meant directly feeding the war.
Another aspect of the security problem was the chat traffc. Chat (or kat) is a local drg
widely used in Somalia, its use spreading rapidly in wartime. The production and trade of
chat has become a major economic activity at the expense of local food production. There
is a distinct danger that food aid could perpetuate the chat business. By depressing food
prices, food aid might simultaneously make local food production less attractive than growing
chat.
Transporting chat by road and air constitutes a growing business. Chat planes arrive daily in
Somalia and Somaliland from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, as the local production can not
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keep pace with demand. Chat planes are the most regular and reliable means of transport,
and aid agencies have frequently used chat planes on the return run for their own transport.
Chat transport by car constitutes an increasing danger in road traffc, as drivers hurr to get
their cargo fresh to the market and often are intoxicated themselves.
Reconstructing the Somali state?
The question of indigenous responsibility and administrative capacity is essential if relief aid
is to be handled and terminated responsibly. Customarily, administrative responsibIlity is
organised in a state. In a sItuation as in Somalia, where the state in 1990 ceased to exist,
donors might be tempted to support the re-establishment of a central state authority.
However, it could also be argued that the implosion of the Somali state freed the Somali
society from a straight-jacket and offers a unique opportunity for Somalia to develop new
administrative structures that are based on delegation from the bottom upwards, and hence
represent the majority and are accountable to the local people. In that case, a new central
state administration should, if at all, come at the end of the process which would be aborted
by an early formation of a central state apparatus.
The United Nations intervention in 1992-94, which for some time was almost totally
dominated by the United States, has been criticised for being preoccupied with re-establishing
a central state in Somalia (Prunier 1997). The UN intervention has been described in several
publications and need not be repeated here (see Heinrich 1997; Sahoun 1994; Samatar 1995).
What is important for our analysis is that part of the UN initiative which led to the Addis
Ababa agreement in 1993 to organise "district councils" in Somalia. Utilising local foci and
opportunities, the district councIls were negotiated with local elders and other persons seen
to represent, in one capacity or other, the local constituencies.
The process of district council formation was uneven. In some areas the councils were hardly
representative, elsewhere they seemed to develop into genuine representation. In some places
the process turned sour, in others it was abandoned altogether. One important dividing line
between aid agencies is the position taken on the emerging district councils. Some see in the
district councils the nuc1eus of a genuine bottom-up representation of the people, others see
the top-down approach of the United Nations in initiating the process. This view holds that
the councIls can never become democratic, administrative bodies.
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The Life and Peace Institute (LP I) in Uppsala, Sweden, was invited in 1992 by the UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General in Somalia to assist in strengthening the role
of the civil society in the peace process. This assistance was based on an understanding that
"peace is not a condition that can be achieved by signing agreements at conference tab les, but
rather, peace is a process that has to involve the entire society". In line with that philosophy,
the LPI, according to its own assessment, "supported traditional leaders of the Somali
communities, chiefs, elders, religious leaders, but also women's groups and intellectuals to
play an active role in peacebuilding on the local leveL. By supporting the formation of
councils for self-administration on the district and regionallevels, the LPI - in its own view -
has combined a community-based peacebuilding approach with 'institution-building'"
(Heinrich 1997:xi).
Wolfgang Heinrich has recently made a comprehensive assessment of the institute's
experience in this process (1997). He clearly sees the district councils, in those areas where
they became permanent, as genuine representation of the people and as a nucleus for a
bottom-up reconstruction of an administration. He criticises other NGOs for questioning the
legitimacy of the councils, claiming that the NGOs otherwise tend to uncritically register and
negotiate with any "authorities" for fear of being evicted or losing work permits. He claims
that a "constructive engagement" could be a more adequate approach for NGOs. In that way
"NGOs could strengthen the foundation of a system of 'good governance'. To wait for the
establishment of a national governent, which will most likely attempt to reinstall another
top-down, administrative structure with centralised control, is definitely the worst alternative"
(Heinrich 1997:123). He expects that the emerging and growing contro1 of the district
councils wil eventually marginalise the warlords, dring out their support and source of
finance and supplies.
Heinrich's analysis conveys a vision of a bottom-up reorganisation of Somali administration.
It goes from the district councils to regional councils and eventually up to a loose federation-
type national roof-administration, without militar power and dependent on a tax base under
the control of the lower councils, and is thus controlled from below. Instead ofre-establishing
a state apparatus in the classical sense, Somalia could do without a central state, thereby
giving room for strong and self-reliant local units and se1f-administrations. The sovereign
would be the people, as represented in the district councils, and the state apparatus would be
nothing but a roof - a coordinating body depending on popular control and consent.
Reflecting this vision, the LPI advocates establishment of a local police force responsible to
local councils, a local tax base for the district councils, and independent local courts based
on traditional 1aw and nationally negotiated codes. (Sture Normark, LPI, interview 31.3.1998)
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There is a question whether the LPI District Councils-approach is the best road towards the
envisaged goal, or whether the Somali elans consider the district councils yet another
imposition which prevents them from developing their "Xeer" and their own system of
fluctuating alliances into a viable system of political authority from below. Other agencies
criticise the district councils as a UN-imposed structure without legitimacy or representative
qualities. Less critically, Said S. Samatar describes the district councils as an attempt at
bottom-up organisation, but criticises theim for having unelear functions and authority, and
lacking legitimacy. Part of the problem was the speed at which UNOSOM implemented the
programe, which left no time for local reconciliation. While the UN initiative was designed
to marginalise the warlords, the process was neither impartial nor indigenous (Minority Rights
Group 1995: supplement p. 2-3).
Possibly an alternative "Somalia st yle" democracy might emerge after a protracted process of
reconciliation and debate, and materialise as a highly decentralised administration on local
and district leveIs, controlled by and accountable to the people through the traditional elan and
family structure. Democratic decisions might be reached by consensus after long Somali-
st yle public debates, and positions might be assigned according to a general feeling of elan
balance, rather than (or in addition to) elections. The structure would have a coordinating
body at nationallevel with no military or other coercive power.
The position of aid agencies in Somalia
Analyzing the current history of aid agencies in Somalia with reference to questions of
authority, collaborating partners, and recipients, several distinctions appear.
Agencies can be distinguished with respect to the principles of neutrality versus solidarity.
Typical for the first position, of neutrality, is the Red Cross and Red Crescent family of
agencies offering reliefregardless ofpolitical position and socIal or other standing. For them,
neutrality and impariality is a precondition for their abi1ity to act in conflct situations, on
both sides of the frontlines, and on all sides in emergency situations. They do not take a
position on the district councils.
Those adhering to the solidarity principle can be further subdivided. Two distinct positions
emerge in relation to the district councils. Some donors actively support the district councils,
in line with the arguments most forcefully presented by Life and Peace, and try to encourage
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their assumption of responsibility and local control. They train personneI of the district
councils and improve their administrative capacities so they can develop into effective local
governent. Others question their legitimacy, seeing them as alien bodies imposed on Somali
society by the UN. These groups prefer to work with local elders and religious leaders,
hoping for a process which eventually wil bring forth a genuine representation of the Somali
people in locally legitimised administrative bodies.
Yet other donors leave the question of administrative relations entirely to their Somali
counterparts, working only through indigenous NGOs through whom they distribute their aid.
Agencies which flag solidarity know that the district councils may not be ideal, yet offer a
nucleus for a positive development towards grassroots representation. There is stil a risk that
the district councils may develop in the "wrong" direction, becoming new bodies of control,
and eventually a central authority with control from above. On the other hand, this danger
can be minimised by active support to capacity development and nurturing of genuine
democratic attitudes and practice.
Aid organisations who do not support the district councils, have little choIce but to work with
local leaders on an ad hoc temporary base. This position, however, runs the risk that other
forces within Somali society, with ambitions to re-establish the military central state structure,
wil re-align and entrench their grip on central state power. This risk is, of course, also
present for aid organisations that leave it to their local partners to solve their political affairs
alone.
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Il: REPORTS FROM INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES:
In order to map out the views of the aid agencies further, we conducted structured interviews
with several Scandinavian and international agencies active in Somalia after 1990. Interviews
were made on telephone, mail and/or E-mail, often in a combination. A set of questions was
sent to all respondents to serve as a guideline with respect to the following issues:
o Who are the receivers of aid?
o the issue of dependency
o Reconstruction of authorities
o Democracy
o The relation to the state
o Security
o Empowerment.
A sumary of the interviews with each agency follows below. These are presented in the
nature of "field notes". All were conducted in early 1998.
The Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo (Jan Håkonsen)
The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) has been involved in Somalia since 1981 when it started
rebuilding a rehabilitation centre for the handicapped in Mogadishu. Since 1988 NRC is also
supporting a hospital in Berbera. Since 1991, when the crisis reached Mogadishu, NRC has
supported the emergency aid of the I C R C, and also the I F R C. In recent years, NRC has
spent 10 to 12 milion NOK annually in Somalia.
The primary aim was to rebuild and strengthen the Somali Red Crescent. Support to the local
organisation of the Red Crescent was all the time given through I C R C or I F R C.
The Red Cross is constitutionally mandated to be neutral. The Red Cross could therefore not
involve itself in political processes. Staff members took care not to be seen together with UN
authorities, especially when the UN became part in the conflct, in 1993. This caused a
dilemma, though, because one was aware that neutrality in practice can favour one side.
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In 1990, the Red Crescent was the only local country-wide aid organisation to relate to. This
applies also to Somaliland at that time.
The district councils which the UN later tried to build up, did not function well. They were
created by UNOSOM, on basis of outdated elan maps, there was little public representation,
no delegation, no "ownership", they were rather built on the opportunism of individuals who
saw a chance to cooperate with them. The Red Crescent built its work mainly on its own
national organisation. Later, when Somaliland emerged, there were independent authority
structures in the North. In the rest of the country, there are no authorities to work with. In
fact, owing to the lack of authorities, the Red Crescent Mother-and-Child-elinics functioned
for som e time as a kind of Ministry of Health.
In the North East, there is now a process going on to build up a "Puntland state", as a
regional authority built on local administrations, without ambitions of secession and
international recognition.
Security: Somalia was the first time the Red Cross resorted to the exceptional practice of
hiring armed guards. Hiring was entirely elan based: the elans, not the Red Cross, paid and
organised them. "We even had to change guards when crossing the 'green line' in
Mogadishu".
Local volunteers who know the situation suggested that. the Red Cross introduced public
kitchens in Mogadishu. This greatly reduced the danger of looting, saince ready cooked food
has low resale value for soldiers.
Chat is seen as a big socIal problem and a drain on local resources. In the North, there is no
big problem with chat production replaeing food. Chat is mostly imported, since Siad Barré's
governent in 1989 tried to stop chat production by buring and destroying the fields.
Production stopped while consumption continued. In Somalia, an estimated 100 to 200 000
dollars is spent daily on chat import, earned through export of hides, meat, and cattle.
To avoid dependency, the Red Cross is conscious of the need to reduce relief aid as soon as
possible, and to strengthen local Red Crescent organisations. Receiver orientation takes the
form of support to the Red Crescent, which has its own loca1 network and relations to the elan
structure. In 1992, as soon as the crisis was over, food distribution was reduced to encourage
home production. When local food distribution became necessar again because of recent
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floods, the Red Cross used local traders for distribution. Thus food prices were kept low and
affordable for the poor. Distribution is continued only as long as absolutely necessary.
The Norwegian Red Cross saw the UN as par of the conflct, not as a neutral mediator. At
the beginning, as long as Mohammed Sahnoun was the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General, there were attempts to support local initiatives for a solution. Later the
UN initiative became a massive operation with an unelear mandate.
The District CouncIls were never representative, because they were not created in direct
contact with the people. Legitimate authorities do not exist today. The only people with
authority are the local elders and elan leaders. They wil have to negotiate the issues in their
way. Only the Somalis themselves can solve the crisis and to work out their form of
democracy. There may eventually be a kind offederal governent as a roof over local or
regional units. We can only help indirectly by not supporting the undemocratic forces.
The biggest problem in the relationship between humanitarian aid and administrative
reconstruction is that outside interests get involved and meddle in Somali issues. The Red
Cross is mandated to keep neutral. We have to be careful not to involve ourselves in things
we have no controlover. First and foremost, we should avoid flooding the country with
outside help. The Somalis have to do the groundwork themselves.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Genève (Laurent Felley)
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been involved in Somalia since the
Ogaden conflict in 1982, when it visited and protected prisoners ofwar. Later, ICRC offered
general support to the Somali Red Crescent. In the 1992 famine it had a feeding programme
through public kitchens which distributed ready cooked food to up to one milion people.
There was a definite concem to avoid dependency by involving local communities, and
paricularly women, in the programme activities. The distribution of seeds and tools, support
to fisheries, cattle vaccination etc. were intended to support self-suffciency. The Red Cross
tried to avoid price deterioration through reduced food production. They also were concerned
not to create tensions with traders.
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Security problems were continuous by 1993. All values were exposed to robberies, including
cars, communication equipment, stocks and warehouses. When the situation became
intolerable, the ICRC moved to Nairobi, leaving the work to the local Red Crescent or local
Somalis under ICRC contract. Distribution was also organised through existing commercial
networks. The traders could do the transport much more effciently and care for safety by
themselves.
The ICRC says it worked through local elders, but also coordinated with politicians, including
the warlords where necessary. It kept links with the UN, but took care to coordinate with
them - not to be coordinated by them. It was diffcult to have neutrality accepted. It
demanded efforts in networking and talking to all sides. Neutrality had to be proven by
actions. Coordination was done only to avoid duplication and to close gaps. Keeping
independent to protect neutrality was a major concern of ICRC.
Receivers: The Red Cross distributed directly to the beneficiaries, and ICRC had its own
specialists in the field assess the needs, on the basis of information from field officers. Expert
staff checked the information on the spot and decided on needs.
ICRC holds that aid should not be used to support political or administrative reconstruction.
The goal of aid is only to offer relief for the needs of people affected. There is a big debate
going on whether aid can prolong a conflict. However, one can not just let people die to
shorten the conflct. One has to be careful about the way one is operating, to make sure food
is going to the civil population, not to soldiers. The aim is not to achieve peace, but to show
humanitarian solidarity in case of emergencies. This work necessarily implies many
disappointments and few successes.
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
Genève:
The interview came at an extremely diffcult time, - the hostage crisis in Mogadishu was
going on. I was advised to talk to Jan Håkonsen from the Norwegian Red Cross, and take
his answers for the IFRC's: "...he is our best reference..."
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Life and Peace Institute (LPI), Uppsala (Sture Normark)
Life and Peace is involved in Somalia since 1992 when it was invited by the UN as adviser
to the local democratisation process. Life and Peace supports the process of rebuilding
governental structures from the local level and upward. This process was described before,
with reference to arecent evaluation (Heinrich 1997). Life and Peace sees in the Somali
situation a historically unique chance to create a governental structure from the beginning,
involving the local communities and the people. "This offers a unique opportunity to build
a decentralised administrative structure that can be effectively controlled by its constituent
communities" (Heinrich 1997: 124). Life and Peace tries to organise assistance for the
empowerment of these nascent local structures.
Life and Peace considers that by now (1998) the district councils have been well established.
Hence, all NGOs should work with them on the local leveL. Some years ago, several NGOs
had their own local contacts, but the councils have now become so strong that all NGOs
should recognise them as local authorities.
Life and Peace works on capacity building in the councils. Education and training were given
priori ty. The Somalis demanded help in training. Life and Peace concentrated much of its
help on educational measures, inc1uding on the job training, democracy training,
administrative skils, book keeping and other skilIs.
As far as authority on a higher level is concerned, Somaliland can serve as a model, LPI says.
Here, state authorities were constructed as a roof over the local councils. Later a federal
Somali state governent might be formed. Te process has to grow from within and from the
bottom, care has to be taken to avoid an imposition from above.
Local authorities must successively recapture power from the warlords, gradually marginalise
them, dry out their resources and their support. That is not possible without support for the
councils from outside. It will only work if all NGOs support the local structures created in
the councils. An interplay between humanitarian aid and reconstrction is absolutely
important. "Peace and development are one and the same". Life and Peace is continuing to
work with this interrelationship. Aid agencies ought to recognize this relationship and direct
their assistance to support the reconstruction of peaceful future administrative structures, not
to interfere with it.
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Security was a big problem. Cars would be stolen or hijacked at once. To keep lower costs,
LPI had to hire cars from local businessmen who took care of security and assurance.
Sometimes they sent cars with their own security guards, but usually they had their local
contacts assuring safety. Transport was the big cost factor. UNOSOM had their own cars,
but were also sometimes forced to hire private cars.
Chat: Life and Peace works on a research on the effects of chat. It is important to work with
local organisations. It is difficult to intervene in the chat business, because significant
economic interests are involved, which oppose any intervention. Only if the local authorities
take up the matter and inItiate a local debate, can anything be done against the chat trade.
Christian Aid (CA), London (Phil Craine)
CA is not an operational agency. It funds only local NGOs who car out projects in
Somalia, mainly EDGS (Ecumenical Development Group for Somalia). It started work in
Somalia as early as during the drought of 1985. Since 1987 it changed emphasis to long-
term development work, rehabilitating water boreholes in the North East.
CA reports problems of making local communities contribute to, or take responsibility for,
programes and projects. This is probably due to EDGS' reputation ofbeing a "soft" donor
agency, considered as a charity. Communities simply refused to take their share of
responsibility and finance for projects. They left it to EDGS to run them - or to let them
break down.
EDGS is said to have had relatively few security problems, apar from the death of one staff
member. Security problems were in general lower in the North East. They do report,
however, problems of being accused by the Islamic Front of having foreign, paricularly
Christian support.
CA had little direct contact with the district councils, but welcomed them as worthwhile
initiatives who have stood their test after the UN left. At the same time, CA notes the
apparent inability of the UN to impose a political settlement. In retrospect, they say, it was
probably the right decision to leave in 1995.
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In the North East, CA sees the elan elders as strong local authorities, but also the local elan-
based militia. "The newly emerging local authorities (ineluding the North Eastern regional
authority in Bosaso) must be taken into account too. These all have some degree of legiti-
macy I think. In the South, the warlords have taken over, and legitimacy is much less!" -
"Eventually a central governent will be formed with power sharing mechanisms to ensure
multi-elan representation. It could take a long time... I think Somaliand will finally come
back. "
CA sees no relationship between short term emergency relief and administrative
reconstruction. But in long term development projects one has to consider the effects on
reconstruction. Only the Somali people themselves can bring peace to their country, but
foreign powers can offer economic incentives to foster democracy and reconciliation.
Save the Children (SC), London / (An Mulcahy, Nairobi)
Save the Children was in Somaliland already in the 1950s, and has been in the South since
the late 1970s. In the 1980s the agency worked with refugees, from 1991 to 1996 in
Somaliland. In Mogadishu it worked with refugees earlier. In the South, it elosed down in
1994 due to security reasons.
There is much concern to make the receivers participate and take responsibility, share tools
and organise themselves (e.g. to administer seed multiplication on a common patch of land,
and other tasks). Long term involvement is encouraged. In the North, the elan strcture
made such efforts difficult. When the agency felt that it was manipulated by the governent
of Somaliland, it elosed down its operation.
SC follows a "food need" approach, by diversifying food production according to needs.
They encourage production, especially of vulnerable families. Besides food needs, the need
to pay education and health fees is considered in measures to stimulate production.
SC works with vilage elders and, to some extent, the sharia administration. "There wil
probably be no efforts to establish a national governent yet for a long time to come", is the
organisation's assessment. The problem is to keep a roof over the elans. For the time being
there are not even any strong local authorities.
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Political-administrative reconstruction is a diffcult issue in Somalia. At the moment it is too
early to pursue it. The experience of UNOSOM shows that it wil take a long time. At some
time. "Hargeisa tried to utilise our programme but we withdrew... To use humanitarian aid
to strengthen administrative structures is not the way to go. Political influences do
unfortunately come from outside. Ethiopia, Egypt, and IGADD have their agenda in Somalia.
That does not make reconstrction easier. Maybe keeping things separate is not a bad
thing... "
SC holds that democracy can at present at best be supported in small ways, on local leve!, at
the 'Beeo' leveL. Decision-making processes can only be encouraged in very practical matters.
One can see people discuss and come to agreements on issues like sharing a fax. People
come together - but not for longer-term planning. But one can try to encourage more
dialogue and debate. Or there is a chance to work with women's groups, such as OXFAM
does.
Security problems were at times very senous. At one time, when Aideed took over
Beletswaine for nine months, a local team continued the work while the agency pulled out.
SC also had to hire watchmen, although one felt uncomfortable with it.
The chat traffic has a tremendous impact in Hargeisa (Somaliland). It influences the
programmes of the organisation. The drain on resources is tremendous. There are security
guards chewing chat for more than twice their salaries, and the women have to make up for
it by working... Land is increasingly being reverted to chat production.
At som e point in the early 1990s, the United Nations had a positive role through UNOSOM.
But later they got out of touch with life on the ground. They have developed their own
agenda. The district councils, or whatever remains of them after the UN pulled out, are not
representative at all (at least in Beletswaine region). They were set up in a hurr. It takes
much more time to settle issues with the clans. The people are still left outside, remaining
without representatives. There is little authority that can act across the district.
Save the Children tries to cooperate on a local leve!, keeping direct links to the elders. In an
urban context, they keep the administration informed but don't involve themselves.
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Médecins sans Frontières (MsF), Nairobi / (Jan Stevens, Kismayu)
MsF has been active in Somalia since April 1992, initially as a temporary emergency
intervention to giv e health assistance to the population in Kismayu and upgrade the local
hospitaL.
A "receiver oriented approach" was soon established, MsF says, by creating a hospital
managing board trying to shift responsibilities to the hospital staff and the community.
MsF supported the independent police created by UNOSOM. There are no other
administratively responsible authorities in place, says MsF. Problems are tackled through
elders and other influential people in town. MsF has withdrawn from Kismayo five times in
six years, mostly to put pressure on the local population to take more responsibility.
MSF considered the district councils a very good initiative and cooperated with them when
needed. However, after the UN retreated, the councils lost most of their potential. At the
moment, MsF judges that there are no legitimate authorities on local leve!, only elders. In
the near future, one might expect "some kind of trans-elan administration in a regional set-
up... or a hyper centralistic military or religious regime". Hopefully, regional developments
might eventually join up in a federation.
The MsF representative expresses his fear that aid money could only interfere with any honest
administration building, and corrpt the process. Democracy, he is afraid, "might not be the
most appropriate system for Somalia".
Dutch InterChurch Aid (DIA), Utrecht (Bea Stolte)
DIA got involved in Somalia in the beginning of the 1980es- by ai ding refugees. Later water
rehabilitation was added. The basic aim was to make people self supporting, and to assist in
emergencies. DIA also supported fisheries rehabilitation and development along the North-
East coast. DIA worked with EDGS as local partner, the same organisation as Christian Aid
supported.
Emergency aid should always be related to rehabilitation. To enhance the ownership of the
programme, the local partners (EDGS) always negotiated with local strctures.
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There have been security problems. These were always solved through negotiation with
elders. The traditional structures have assisted EDGS so it could remain in Garowe region,
even during the most difficult times, when DIA had to retreat. DIA had no direct cooperation
with UN personneI or structures. But EDGS did involve itself in meetings organised by the
district councils.
Concerning development of a national governent, DIA reports a remark of an elderly lady
saying: "The international community is trying to impose a governent upon the Somali
society. When they stop meddling, we wil come with our own solution."
Traditional authorities should have a role but it wil take a long time until new structures
emerge. Aid can only help to the degree it can strengthen the independence of people. One
should listen to the existing traditional structures and hear what they have to say about this.
CARE Somalia, Nairobi (David Neff)
CAR started in Somalia in 1981 with relief aid to refugees.
Security: CAR is facing fewer problems than other agencies because of its longstanding
good reputation with the local people. Security problems are often related to labour relations,
but CAR deals with such issues "quickly and according to the Somali labour law, and open
and respectful treatment of staff is helping to uphold the reputation".
CAR says it keeps open communication with various types and levels of administration.
CAR "welcomed the military intervention in 1992". However, by mid 1993 "UNOSOM was
so clearly off on the wrong track" that CAR appealed to Boutros Ghali to "set his agency
straight". This never happened, and UNOSOM "ended in a failure". The intention was to end
the war, provide access to vulnerable populations, and re-establish a governent. But the
huge amount of material and resources brought in, gave the Somali warlords much to fight
over - it was the sec ond golden goose for Somalia.
The UNOSOM district council initiativ e "was viewed by most aid agencies as misdirected,
to say the least" . It intended to bring democracy to Somalia, but was not aware of Somali
democratic traditions. It enjoyed little credibility in the local community and the aid
community.
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Receiver orientation: the days of handouts are gone in Somalia. Aid has to get tough
conditions. Implementation has to start through local partners. Most donors insist on greater
community input, participation, user fee systems, etc. CAR supports different activities to
boost food production and to replace aid with self supply.
Legitimate authority exists to some degree at the community and vilage leve!, seldom beyond.
"The crisis in Somalia is over. What we expect today is a political process Somalia st yle.
This is characterised by one step forward, some steps back, some steps forward, a step back -
and this will go on for years..." A confederation might perhaps materialize in the end.
Pushing from outside can only produce a short term, ineffective, central governent which
will not last more than half a year and might well end in renewed large scale conflict.
CARs representative distinguishes three time frames for aid: short-term emergency life-
saving programmes, medium term mechanisms of employment generation and work
programmes, and long-term poverty alleviation, economic and political development, local
capacity building etc. All humanitarian aid is in away politicaL. W orking through local
NGOs and community structures can help build administrative capacities. But fostering
democracy "sounds too much like UNOSOM", "democracy is ramp ant in Somalia, it needs
to be channelled and tamed" .
Norwegian Church Aid, Nairobi - (Petros Wontamo)
NCA became involved in 1992, assisting returning refugees in Somalia.
NCA says it was seeking active participation by involving the receivers at all levels from
planning to implementation. Everyhing was done with the beneficiaries' full knowledge and
active involvement, "it was their pro gramme " . NCA assisted local capacity building by
working with district and regional administrative councIls. The local community is both the
beneficiary and the receiver.
Instead of relief distribution, NCA has wherever possible taken measures to assist the local
communities with agricultural tools and seeds and lo ans to increase food production.
Security: NCA did not encounter major security problems. The programme is "owned and
run by the people", the communities in the area are its owners.
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The UNOSOM intervention is seen as a top-down approach with little input of the Somalis
themselves. The concept of district councIls may have been correct and necessar, but lacked
adequate background and support. Stil, NCA cooperates with them and tries to strengthen
them.
There are no legitimate authorities in Somalia now. It is hoped that a transitional national
structure with some leve! of legitimacy will emerge in the future. The Somalis must solve
their crisis by themselves. But the international community has a big challenge to offer help
to the Somali people in this process. They can use humanitarian aid also to strengthen the
process of national reconciliation and socio-political reconstruction. Democratisation in
Somalia may be a slow process, it demands planned education at a grass-roots level, "in a
traditional gerontocratic society where tradition and ethnicity play a decisive role.."
Norwegian People's Aid, Oslo (Trude Falch)
NPA has worked in Somalia since 1992-3, initiated by a request from Somali refugees in
Norway to help with de-mining. However, a fact-finding mission in 1993 conc1uded that
other forms of involvement were more immediately needed. Instead of de-mining, a
programme of support for health, agriculture and education in Northern Somalia was
recommended.
NP A says the programme from the beginning had a component of strengthening local
authorities through cooperation. Re-building structures of administrative responsibility was
a central aspect.
Security was a big and continuous problem. There were threats to the management, assaults
and pressure on the staff. The organisation hired guards, and after a while the guards were
outnumbering the regular staff members by about 45 to 30. The guards were astabilising
factor, but also constituted local employment. The community wanted NP A to continue hiring
them even when the need was reduced. Scaling down became a question of negotiating with
the community.
The chat traffc did not affect NPA's work much, although pervasive. Chat is flown in from
abroad, and the aid organisations can facilitate their own transport by using the empty
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returning chat planes. It does not affect agriculture in the project areas, as this is a nomadic
area with very little agriculture, and chat is not grown.
At present the organisation tries to change its objectives towards reconstruction and capacity
building. There is a tremendous need for socIal mobilisation. A local contribution is
expected, but there are no structures to provide a budget for even the most basic things.
Offering medical training for health personneI is hardly effective if there are no funds to pay
them salaries, or to build health centres. There are councIls of elders of the sub-clans, but
they have no budget. How can a hospital be made sustainable without any local budget
authority?
There were no district councIls in the North, where the NP A operated, so the issue of
cooperation did not arise. The governent in Hargeisa (Somaliland) functions well in areas
which accept its authority. But the project area lies in a kind of no-man's land. Once the
district of Puntland is being organised, this may change. There are more or less legitimate
local authorities, although it is unclear if they can maintain their positions.
Humanitarian aid and administrative reconstrction are closely linked - aid can attempt to
strengthen what could become viable structures. Democracy is a difficult subject in Somalia.
But low-level grassroots work, involving the people, is a part of fostering democracy. In
Somalia the pattern is for negotiations continue until a consensus is reached. It has to be
possible to buIld on such local traditions. It is the only way left for Somalia.
United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), Nairobi (Gian Paolo Aloi)
The offce was established in 1993 to respond to Somalia's move from an emergency situation
to rehabilitation and development. It became a UNP project in 1994, being seen as the future
Somalia Ministry of Planning and Economic Management. The establishment was an effort
in capacity building through technical assistance, to strengthen existing administrative
structures and make them sustainable. As such, UNOS considers the local administrations
their counterparts as well as partners.
23
Schematic summary of agency responses:
Donor active authority district UN Security
since counciIs
Christian 1987 Develop slowly - supported positive not too
Aid eventually a "root' but much
nat.gov. may be formed limited problems
Save the 1950es does hardly exist not Failed Problems.
Children - only rudimentary accepted Watchmen
hired.
Life and 1992 Build up support from Strong supported Problems.
Peace below - unique chance support hire cars.
MsF 1992 Hardly existent. Lost their supported Problems.
Cooperate-but with care effect ini tiall y Local
solutions.
Dutch Inter- 1980 non existent. Takes time Supported sceptical Problems
Church Aid to develop. eventually solved by
central "root' govt. elders
Norwegian 1981 Neutrality. Leave polit. Were never UN is part Problems.
Red Cross negotiat. to local elders represen-. of conflict Hired
tative guards
IFRC (see Norwegian Red Cross)
ICRC 1982 Neutrality. ScepticaL Severe
Work through elders. Keep neutraL problem.
use local
Traders
CAR 1981 Village level authorities Not Welcomed Small
- state yet to be formed represent. UN miLinterv. problem.
- end of a long process but wrong track
Norwegian 1992 Not much at present - sceptical Top-bottom Distribut.
Church Aid strengthen process toward approach through
representative capacities traders
Norwegian 1993 In the North there is gov. non exist. No factor Big
People's Aid structure -needs support in North in North problems
UNOS 1993 UNOS is there to
strengthen local authorities
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Donor Democracy Dependency Receivers Empowerment
Christian Only on local leve! Work with beneficiaries Work with
Aid developing. local perople (and their local elders
animals)
Save the Support dialogue Self-suffciency- Vulnerable Very little scope
Children - long term challenge Food needs groups at present
Life and Unique chance- sup- 1\ void dependency Local Central goal of
Peace port local democracy communities the programe
MsF "No good idea for Tried in vain to The wounded: has to come from
Somali society" hand over - frust. not much exp. inside
D. is ramp ant in Somalia
Dutch Inter- Hear what elders Put demands Community Support local
Church Aid have to say to your gifts.. ownership efforts
diffcult
Norwegian Only Somalis them- cautious reduction Patients, Not by Red Cross
Red Cross selves can work out of rations local comun. don't support the
wrong side...
IFRC (see Norwegian Red Cross)
ICRC Only Somalis them- involve women Local people Self-reliance
selves can develop -ICRC politically
democracy neutral
CAR Somalis know about Put demands Communities Capacity
democracy - support them must cooperate building
Norwegian Local process, needs important to community is Help to
Church Aid support, education avoid dependency beneficiery selfhelp
Norwegian Local traditions avoid depend. - Local organi- Strengthen
People's Aid must be the base build up production sations capacities
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Anex:
1991
March 1991
May-June 1991
Nov. 1991
April 1992
October 1992
December 1992
December 1992 to
March 93
8 January 1993
15 March 1993
37 March 1993
4 May 1993
June 1993
June to Sept. 1993
March 1994
March 1995
Important events in the Somali crisis
Siad Barré flees from Mogadishu
Looting in the town
UN begins humanitarian aid to Somalia
Peace Conference in Djibouti
Fighting in Mogadishu. In four months 25 000 civilians killed
United Nations are asked to intervene
UN appoints Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun Special Representative
of the Secretary General to Somalia
Sahnoun resigns after criticising the UN reactions to Somalia
The UN Security Council approves resolution 794 establishing
UNITAF. Operation Restore Hope begins.
UNOSOM I
Addis Ababa agreement of ceasefire between warlords
Second meeting in Addis Ababa with peoples' representatives present.
Agreement signed only by the warlords. Provision for establishing
district councils.
UNOSOM Il
War erupts again
State of war between Aideed and UNOSOM
Last US troops out of Somalia
Last UN troops out of Somalia
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Interviews with aid donors:
Christian Aid: Phil Craine, London (e-mail) 22.4.
Save the Children: Søren Pedersen, Oslo: 6.4. D. O'Connell, London (on telephone) 17.4.
An Mulcahey, Nairobi (on telephone) 23.4.
Médecins sans Frontière: Jan Stevens, Badoia / Nairobi (e-mail) 28.4, 11.5 
ICRC: Laurent Felley, Geneve (on telephone) 28.4.; Brigitte Troyon 19.5. (on e-mail)
CAR: David Neff, Nairobi (e-mail) 27.4. (first part) 28.4. (second part)
Norwegian Red Cross: Jan Håkonsen , Oslo (on telephone) 7. 4.
Norwegian Church Aid: Stein Villumstad: 18.2.
Odd Evjen: 5. 4. Petros Wontamo, Nairobi (on e-mail and telephone) 19. /20. 4.
Norsk Folkehjelp: Svein Olsen: 2.4., Trude Falch, Oslo (on telephone), 15.4.
Life and Peace: Sture Normark, Uppsala (on telephone) 31.3.
AG KED: Wolfgang Heinrich, Bonn (on telephone), 20.3., 5.5.
Dutch InterChurch Aid: Bea Stolte, Utrecht (on E-mail) 4. 5.
UNOS: Gian Paolo Aloi, Nairobi (on e-mail) 29.4.
EHDA: Michael van Notten, Addis Ababa (and Jijiga) interviews 9.11.1996, 20. and 25.5.
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